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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last century, Congress has utilized the Commerce Clause to
varying degrees of success to enact laws regarding violence against
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women,1 gun possession in school zones,2 a national health care system,3
and discrimination.4 Regardless of the merit of each of these laws,
review of these statutes demonstrates that Congress is utilizing the
expansive power of the Commerce Clause for social policy. In doing so,
it has ignored the intended purpose of the Commerce Clause, which is to
give Congress the ability to enact national laws concerning interstate
commerce. By focusing on these areas outlying commerce to the detriment
of the basic purpose of the Commerce Clause, Congress overlooked an
area of the law squarely within the Commerce Clause that is ripe for
federalization—the sale of goods.
Currently, the sale of moveable goods is governed by Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Initially a success over fifty years
ago, Article 2 is becoming unpredictable, outdated, and ineffectual, such
that its defects are blatant even to the most ardent supporter. Over the
past two decades, scholars, practitioners, and judges alike have criticized

1. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994), invalidated by United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Violence Against Women Act stated in part:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender . . . shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory
relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
Id. § 13981(c). The Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional as beyond
congressional power under the Commerce Clause as the activity in question was not
economic in nature nor could the government demonstrate an effect on interstate
commerce. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–14.
2. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994), invalidated by
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Gun-Free School Zones Act prohibited
“any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he or she] knows . . . is
a school zone.” Id. § 922(q)(2)(A). The Supreme Court invalidated the Act as
unconstitutional as it regulated a noneconomic activity. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–64.
3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV
2010). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires individuals to maintain
a certain amount of health care coverage. Id. Although the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Act, it declined to enforce it under the Commerce Clause. Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012). For a more detailed
discussion as to the Commerce Clause reasoning, see infra notes 192–94, 206–08 and
accompanying text.
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000a (2006). Section 2000a(a)
provides: “All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation on the ground of
race, color, religion, or national origin.” Id. § 2000a(a). The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Congress’s enactment of the Civil Rights Act in two seminal cases:
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). In these cases, the Court articulated that Congress may
regulate activity that, in general, substantially affects interstate commerce, even if the
Act touches upon a purely local incident. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258;
Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 305.
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Article 2 for these and a variety of other reasons.5 Given the inability to
revamp Article 2 under the current uniform code amendment process,
the law of sales is ready for a fresh mechanism to maintain the speed,
efficiency, and fairness necessary in commercial transactions.
Although sales law is not in imminent danger of collapse, eventually
Article 2’s cracks will become crevasses as the nature of our commercial
environment and technology changes and develops the manner in which
parties conduct sales. Rather than wait until the collapse, these defects
should be acknowledged and addressed now. Acting before the problem
becomes overwhelming allows adequate time to craft a comprehensive
and meaningful body of sales law instead of hastening to find a solution
after the collapse.
Accordingly, this Article argues that rather than wait until the defects
become insurmountable, we should act now to address the defects in the
law of sales and enact a federal sales act to supplant Article 2 using
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. Part II details the
defects of Article 2 that are in need of repair, which include creating
inconsistent results across the states, failing to adapt to changing trends
in our modern commercial environment, and utilizing a private drafting
process that fails to balance the competing interests of businesses and
consumers. Part II then demonstrates that the current uniform code
model cannot correct those defects due to its biased, cumbersome, and
consensus-oriented amendment process.
Next, Part III proposes a federal sales act to replace Article 2 and
explains why a federal sales act is a practical solution for the sale of
goods. Although the concept of a federal sales act is not novel, the
dramatic changes in our commercial environment over the past sixty
years coupled with the decline of Article 2 make a federal sales act an
appropriate route to achieving a uniform, simple, and predictable body
of sales law.
Finally, Part IV establishes the viability of a federal sales act under the
Commerce Clause, demonstrating that such an act is precisely the type
5. E.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Contracts: The Forgotten Sector of
Commercial Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 725, 739 (1993) (describing how Article 2 limits
its scope to the sale of goods despite the increasing number of transactions involving the
sale of services); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Uneasy Case Against the Uniform
Commercial Code, 62 LA. L. REV. 1097, 1099–1102, 1106 (2002) (noting the private
drafting process of Article 2 that involves the biases of the drafters, the inability to
balance consumer interests and merchant interests, and Article 2’s failure to keep pace
with technology).
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of legislation intended by the clause despite recent Supreme Court
rulings. Moreover, a federal sales act is consistent with the principles of
federalism under which the Framers founded the United States of America.
II. THE NEED FOR FEDERALIZATION
As Article 2 reaches its senior years, its age is beginning to show.
A once shining success has become outdated and increasingly ineffective.
Recent attempts to modernize and clarify Article 2 have failed due to the
uniform laws amendment process and the importance of consensus in
that process.6 Also, the UCC’s private lawmaking process permits certain
interest groups to dominate as the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL or the Commissioners) is ill-suited
for handling competing interests and have no constituency to hold them
accountable for the laws they draft.7
A. A Not-So-Uniform Commercial Code
The Industrial Revolution in the nineteenth century and the ease of
moving goods across state lines on the newly established railway system
created the need for a uniform and predictable body of commercial law
throughout the United States.8 At that time, both practitioners and legal
scholars began to recognize the importance of uniformity in commercial
transactions.9 Because of this recognized need for uniformity, the NCCUSL
formed to provide a recommended body of sales law for each of the
states to enact.10
In 1906, the Commissioners completed the Uniform Sales Act and
officially recommended it for enactment by the states.11 Unfortunately,

6. See Caroline Edwards, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer
Protection: The Refusal To Experiment, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 663, 712 (2004); infra
notes 129–46.
7. See Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 607, 617–18 (2001); infra Part II.B;.
8. Donald J. Smythe, Commercial Law in the Cracks of Judicial Federalism, 56
CATH. U. L. REV. 451, 464–65 (2007).
9. Robert Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 100, 101–02 (1951); William E. McCurdy, Uniformity and a
Proposed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 572, 573 (1939–1940); Smythe, supra note
8, at 465.
10. Lawrence J. Bugge, Commercial Law, Federalism, and the Future, 17 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 11, 12–13 (1992); E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Foreword: Federalism or Uniformity
of Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERS L.J. 527, 529 (1980). The original name was the
Conference of the State Boards of Commissioners on Promoting Uniformity of Law in
the United States, but fortunately it was shortened in 1915. Bugge, supra, at 14.
11. McCurdy, supra note 9, at 577.
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the Uniform Sales Act had limited progress toward its goal of uniformity.12
Only thirty-four states adopted it over a three-decade time span, and the
states that did adopt it enacted it with many of their own amendments.13
This failure likely was due to the formalistic and outdated rules provided
in the Uniform Sales Act, which were a result of modeling it after the
antiquated English Sale of Goods Act of 1893.14
The Commissioners recognized that the Uniform Sales Act failed in
achieving uniformity because it was outdated, inefficient, and too narrow
in scope.15 They set their sights on something bigger—a comprehensive
commercial code.16 Knowing they could not tackle such an undertaking
without assistance, the Commissioners entered into discussions with the
American Law Institute—the drafters of the Restatements of the Law—
to collectively draft this uniform commercial code.17 Three years later,
they reached an agreement on the collaboration process and began drafting
the code.18 The result of this partnership is today’s UCC.19
Given that its creation was based upon the need for a uniform body of
sales law, the UCC expressly sets forth its purpose of uniformity quite
clearly in section 1-103(a): “[I]ts underlying purposes and policies . . .
are: (1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial
12. Taylor, supra note 10, at 530.
13. Id. at 529–30; see also Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 799 (1958).
14. 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & FREDERICK H. MILLER, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE SERIES § 1-102:3 n.1 (2012); McCurdy, supra note 9, at 578. Mackenzie
Chalmers, the drafter of the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893, relied on rules
developed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries such that the English
Sale of Goods Act was outdated from its inception. 1 HAWKLAND & MILLER, supra, § 1102:3 n.1 (quoting William D. Hawkland, Article 2: Sales, in STATE OF NEW JERSEY
STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 19, 19 (1960)).
15. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, REPORT AND
SECOND DRAFT: THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT 5 (1941); K. N. Llewellyn, The
Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558, 558 (1940).
16. Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 546 (2000) (citing 1 JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1, at 3 (3d ed. 1988));
Taylor, supra note 10, at 530.
17. Dom Calabrese et al., Karl Llewellyn’s Letters to Emma Cortsvet Llewellyn
from the Fall 1941 Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 27 CONN. L. REV. 523, 526 (1995); Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History
of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-49, 51 SMU L. REV. 275, 277 (1998); Maggs,
supra note 16, at 546.
18. Kamp, supra note 17, at 277 (citing WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND
THE REALIST MOVEMENT 279–86 (1973)).
19. Id. at 276–77.
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transactions; . . . and (3) to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions.”20 This focus on uniformity in sales law is both legitimate
and essential. Uniformity creates predictability, which promotes economic
development by easing the process of conducting business in a number
of ways.21 First, uniformity prevents businesses from the costly need to
adapt a product and its warranties to satisfy what would otherwise be
varying state laws.22 This reduction of costs enables businesses to
maintain lower prices thus increasing sales or invest the savings in the
improvement of existing products or the development of new products.23
Second, uniformity simplifies transactions through consistency, thereby
reducing the time and costs of negotiating and drafting.24 This reduction
of negotiating and drafting time can benefit the economy through an
increased number of sales as the parties can finalize the agreement and
proceed to the next transaction quickly. Further, the reduction in costs
can result in lower prices to buyers or an investment in new product
development.25
In addition to stimulating economic development, uniformity reduces
disputes.26 Uniformity provides certainty in a transaction, which allows
the parties to know more clearly their contract rights and obligations and
perform accordingly.27 Also, certainty eliminates the incentive of parties
to choose litigation over settlement, reducing the number of lawsuits and
the associated costs to both the parties and the judicial system.28 Moreover,
uniformity reduces the need for forum shopping and removes disputes
over choice of law, relieving some of the burden on the court system.29

20. U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2012).
21. Bugge, supra note 10, at 18; A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law
Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297, 311 (2003).
22. Richard A. Elbrecht, The NCCUSL Should Abandon Its Search for Consensus
and Address More Difficult and Controversial Issues Applying “Process” Concepts, 26
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 147, 151 (1994); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An
Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 138 (1996).
23. See Elbrecht, supra note 22, at 151; Overby, supra note 21, at 311.
24. Bugge, supra note 10, at 18; Overby, supra note 21, at 311; Ribstein &
Kobayashi, supra note 22, at 138.
25. Overby, supra note 21, at 311.
26. See Elbrecht, supra note 22, at 148.
27. Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 253 (1993).
28. See id. at 254.
29. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 22, at 138; see, e.g., Mann v. Weyerhaeuser
Co., 703 F.2d 272, 274 (8th Cir. 1983). See generally R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF
2007 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2009) (providing an overview of state courts’
substantial caseloads); The Feeblest Branch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 2011, at 31 (describing
how state courts are overburdened and underfunded).
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When disputes do occur, uniformity results in equal treatment of similarly
situated parties regardless of their location.30
Despite its clear goal and the benefits of this goal, Article 2 fails at
accomplishing uniformity in the sale of goods. First, Article 2 contains
internal nonuniformity, as evidenced by section 2-318.31 Unlike the
majority of Article 2, which provides one provision per section, section
2-318 offers three alternatives from which states’ legislatures can choose
to enact on when third parties can sue a seller or manufacturer for breach
of warranty.32 The alternatives, aptly named Alternative A, Alternative
B, and Alternative C, cover a wide spectrum of third parties permitted to
sue for breach of warranty.33 By offering these three alternatives rather
than one provision, the drafters endorse nonuniformity in direct
contradiction to their stated purpose. Indeed, nonuniformity is precisely
the result as the distribution of the alternatives among the states is uneven,
with a majority of states adopting Alternative A,34 six states adopting
Alternative B,35 and eight states adopting Alternative C.36 Even with three
alternatives from which to choose, eight states decided not to enact any
of the three alternatives.37 These alternatives result in the same fact pattern
leading to different outcomes depending on the applicable alternative.
30. See Taylor, supra note 10, at 552.
31. U.C.C. § 2-318 (2012); E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Uniformity of Commercial Law
and State-by-State Enactment: A Confluence of Contradictions, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 337,
343 (1978).
32. U.C.C. § 2-318; William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted
by Non-Privity Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions that Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-318 (Alternative A), 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1215, 1228–29 (1993).
33. For a detailed discussion of section 2-318, see Jennifer Camero, Two Too
Many: Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (2012).
34. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have adopted Alternative A. Shawn M. Bates &
Deborah J. Karakowsky, U.C.C. Section 2-318: The ABCs of Defense, COM. & BUS. LITIG.
(Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Litig., Chi., Ill.), Summer 2009, at 1, 17, available at http://
law.capital.edu/TwoColumnPB.aspx?pageid=22402.
35. Alabama, Delaware, Kansas, New York, South Carolina, and Vermont have
adopted Alternative B. Id.
36. Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and
Wyoming have adopted Alternative C. Id.
37. California, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Texas, and Virginia have not enacted any of the alternatives of section 2-318. Id.
Louisiana has adopted every article of the UCC except Article 2A and portions of Article
2. Henry D. Gabriel, The Revisions of the Uniform Commercial Code—Process and
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Second, even though Article 2 covers all sales of goods—not just sales
between businesses—the Commissioners purposely exclude consumeroriented provisions from Article 2, indicating that they believe such
provisions are too controversial and thus prevent state enactment due to
strong business lobbying at the state level.38 As a result, consumeroriented laws are left to the individual states to enact.39 Although some
similarities exist among the laws governing consumer transactions of the
fifty states, quite a few variations exist among them.40 Consequently, by
generally ignoring consumer-oriented provisions in Article 2, the
Commissioners endorse nonuniformity in the sale of goods to consumers.
Third, although the Commissioners discouraged the states from revising
Article 2 before enactment, not one state adopted it without making any
changes.41 For example, thirty-four states amended or chose not to adopt
section 2-201, the statute of frauds,42 thirty-two states amended or chose
not to adopt section 2-202, the parol evidence rule,43 and twenty-nine
states amended or chose not to adopt section 2-207, the battle of the
forms.44 These examples are only three sections from one subchapter of
Article 2; the total number of variations is so staggering that an entire
database exists to track the variations.45 Ultimately, the language and
substance of Article 2 differs not only internally but also from state to

Politics, 19 J.L. & COM. 125, 125 n.1 (1999); Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of
Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1032 n.76 (2002).
38. Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of
the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 13 (1997); Speidel, supra note 7, at 608 & n.5
(citing James J. White, Comments at 1997 AALS Annual Meeting: Consumer Protection
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 219 (1997)).
39. Speidel, supra note 7, at 608.
40. Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Consumers-R-Us: A Reality in the U.C.C. Article 2
Revision Process, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1593, 1600 (1994).
41. Neil B. Cohen & Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting Commercial Law for the New
Millennium: Will the Current Process Suffice?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 551, 552 (1993);
Taylor, supra note 10, at 531; Harold A. Hintze, Note, Disparate Judicial Construction
of the Uniform Commercial Code—The Need for Federal Legislation, 1969 UTAH L.
REV. 722, 722.
42. U.C.C. Local Code Variations, 2010–2011 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. § 2-201, at 110–
19 (West). Twenty-five states did not adopt section 2-201 and nine made changes to the
language prior to adopting Article 2. Id.
43. Id. § 2-202, at 119–24. Twenty-five states chose not to adopt section 2-202
and seven changed the language prior to adopting Article 2. Id.
44. Id. § 2-207, at 133–44. All twenty-nine states chose not to adopt section 2-207
and instead developed their own language. Id.
45. Id. passim. Even in 1966, which was only a short time after the UCC’s
creation, 750 nonuniform variations existed. William A. Schnader, The Uniform Commercial
Code—Today and Tomorrow, 22 BUS. LAW. 229, 230 (1966).
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state such that not one body of sales law exists but fifty different sales
laws.46
Uniformity in the language of the law is just half the battle to achieving
true uniformity.47 The interpretation of those laws by the courts must also
be uniform, which does not occur in the judicial decisions related to Article
2.48 These varying judicial interpretations stem from a number of problems.
First, as discussed above, the judges are working with different language
from state to state so the playing field is uneven from the beginning.49
Additionally, the Commissioners purposefully drafted Article 2 by
relying on broad language and standards such as “reasonableness” and
“trade usage” rather than bright-line rules.50 Regardless of the merits of
this choice,51 such broad language and standards grant judges and juries
wide latitude in their interpretations, leading to a nonuniform application
of the same language or standard.52
For example, courts vary on the interpretation of the phrase “basis of
the bargain” in section 2-313.53 This section dictates that a seller creates
an express warranty when the seller makes an affirmation, describes the
good, or provides a sample of the good when such affirmation, description,
or sample is made part of the basis of the bargain.54 Some courts interpret
46. David M. Phillips, Secured Credit and Bankruptcy: A Call for the Federalization of
Personal Property Security Law, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 66 (1987); Taylor,
supra note 10, at 531.
47. McCurdy, supra note 9, at 578–79 (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTYTHIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 92 (1913));
Robert E. Scott, Is Article 2 the Best We Can Do?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 684 (2001).
48. Scott, supra note 47, at 684.
49. Taylor, supra note 10, at 531.
50. Maggs, supra note 16, at 553–54. The rationale for this decision was to allow
courts to evolve commercial law through their decisions, as the drafters recognized that
amending Article 2 would be difficult. Id.; Imad D. Abyad, Note, Commercial
Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn’s Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 429, 441 (1997).
51. See infra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
52. Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 784–85 (1999); Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 1100; Hintze, supra
note 41, at 734. See generally Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational
Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847 (2000); William C. Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and
the Fact/Law Distinction) in the Interpretation of Written Contracts, 2001 WIS. L. REV.
931. Given the “substantial freedom in the content they give these doctrines[,] . . . [e]ven if
courts do not make systematic errors or have systematic biases, they may consistently
arrive at factual determinations that are ‘surprising’ and legal determinations that are
difficult to predict.” Ben-Shahar, supra, at 813.
53. U.C.C. § 2-313 (2012).
54. Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
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basis of the bargain to require reliance by the buyer on the affirmation,
description, or sample.55 Other courts simply require that the seller make
the affirmation, describe the good, or provide the sample without
requiring any reliance by the buyer.56 Further adding to the variations in
interpretation, among those courts that agree that proof of reliance is not
necessary, conflicts exist as to whether knowledge of the alleged warranty is
necessary.57
Even with relatively straightforward provisions, courts’ interpretations
vary.58 To illustrate, section 2-318’s Alternative A simply states: “A seller’s
warranty [to an immediate buyer] . . . extends to any natural person who
is in the family or household of [the immediate] buyer or who is a guest
in his home.”59 However, the case law varies dramatically as to whether an
employee of a purchaser can sue for breach of warranty under this
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to
the sample or model.
U.C.C. § 2-313(1).
55. E.g., DiIenno v. Libbey Glass Div., Owens-Illinois, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 373, 376
(D. Del. 1987) (“It is clear that a successful action for breach of an expressed warranty
may not be maintained in Delaware absent some reliance by the buyer on the
warranty.”); Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716, 720 (R.I. 1985) (“The plaintiff
who claims breach of express warranty has the burden of proving that the statements or
representations made by the seller induced her to purchase that product and that she
relied upon such statements or representations.”); Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102
S.W.3d 675, 686 (Tex. 2002) (“Reliance is also not only relevant to, but an element of
proof of, plaintiffs’ claims of breach of express warranty . . . .”).
56. E.g., Torres v. Nw. Eng’g Co., 949 P.2d 1004, 1013 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997)
(“[R]eliance is not an essential element of a breach of express warranty claim under the
UCC.”); Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, 894 A.2d 563, 573 (Md. 2006) (“Rite-Aid argues
that . . . the consumer must at least have been aware of its existence prior to the
consummation of the deal. Based on the circumstances surrounding most purchases in
modern commercial dealing, we disagree.”); Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336, 338
(Va. 1992) (“[T]he ‘part of the basis of the bargain’ language . . . does not establish a
buyer’s reliance requirement.”).
57. Compare Schmaltz v. Nissen, 431 N.W.2d 657, 661 (S.D. 1988), with Lutz
Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 1991).
58. See Frank R. Kennedy, Federalism and the Uniform Commercial Code, 29
BUS. LAW. 1225, 1228 (1973–1974) (“Judge Friendly speaks of the difficulties of . . .
‘getting unruly judges to interpret them uniformly.’” (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, IN
PRAISE OF ERIE—AND OF THE NEW FEDERAL COMMON LAW 37 (1964))). Section 2-202 is a
prime example of a seemingly straightforward provision with varying judicial interpretations.
Taylor, supra note 31, at 346. For a detailed discussion of the variations of section 2-202,
see id. at 346–49, as well as infra notes 105–11 and accompanying text.
59. U.C.C. § 2-318(1) (2012).
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provision. Only family members, household members, or guests of the
purchaser may sue a seller for breach of warranty, as the word “employee”
is excluded from the language of Alternative A. Accordingly, many courts
appropriately bar employees in Alternative A jurisdictions from maintaining
a breach of warranty claim.60 Nonetheless, many courts ignore the plain
language and have extended Alternative A to include employees of
purchasers.61
In the end, Article 2 fails to achieve its clear goal of uniformity. Not
only does the language of Article 2 vary state to state, but the judicial
interpretations of Article 2 also vary. With no one court to resolve those
conflicts, Article 2 loses its uniformity and thus its predictability and
simplicity.
B. A Biased Uniform Commercial Code
The UCC is a private code in that it is developed outside the typical
legislative process.62 The Commissioners, comprised of academics,

60. See, e.g., Cowens v. Siemens-Elema AB, 837 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1988);
Halderman v. Sanderson Forklifts Co., 818 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Bruns
v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 605 N.E.2d 395, 432 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). For a detailed
discussion of privity in relation to a purchaser’s employees, see Lauren Fallick,
Comment, Are Employees ‘A’ O.K.?: An Analysis of Jurisdictions Extending or Denying
Warranty Coverage to a Purchaser’s Employees Under Uniform Commercial Code
Section 2-318, Alternative A, 29 NOVA L. REV. 721 (2005). Interestingly, the proposed
final draft of the original 1950 Uniform Commercial Code, which contained only
Alternative A, included language in its official comments specifically stating that
employees are covered under Alternative A; however, this language never made it into
the final version. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (Proposed Official Draft 1950) (“[E]mployees
of an industrial consumer are covered and the policy of this Article intends that neither
the privity concept . . . nor any technical constructions of ‘employment’ shall defeat
adequate protection under this section.”).
61. E.g., McNally v. Nicholson Mftg. Co., 313 A.2d 913, 921 (Me. 1973). The
McNally court stretched the meaning of family to include employees:
Indeed, in the present circumstances, it takes only the attribution of a figurative
bent to the word ‘family’ to bring plaintiff, as an employee of the corporate
‘buyer’, within the policy scope of Section 2-318 since plaintiff may be
regarded as a member of such ‘family’ as a corporation may reasonably be said
to have.
Id.
62. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 604 (1995). The process described in this Article
is a truncated version. For a complete description of the process, see Fred H. Miller,
Realism Not Idealism in Uniform Laws—Observations from the Revision of the UCC, 39
S. TEX. L. REV. 707, 712–16 (1998).
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judges, and practicing attorneys selected by each state,63 appoint members
to a drafting committee to either create a new uniform code or amend a
current UCC article.64 The drafting committee can, but is not obligated
to, consult interested parties during the drafting process.65 The only
party the drafting committee must consult is the American Bar
Association.66 Once the drafting committee completes a draft, the
Commissioners read it line by line then discuss it before taking it to a
vote.67 When voting, the Commissioners have no obligation to represent
the interests of their state and therefore consider themselves independent.68
Although the Commissioners pride themselves on being neutral,69
interest groups representing businesses have influenced the UCC from
its beginning.70 The original push for a uniform commercial law
stemmed from the Merchants’ Association of New York’s desire for
enactment of a federal sales act.71 Moreover, as the Commissioners
undertook the UCC drafting process, they consulted interested industries
and business organizations, including the Merchants’ Association of
New York, not only for background information but also for views on
preferred rules.72
Even now, business interest groups dominate the amendment process,73
with sixty-six percent of third parties involved in the recent Article 2
revision process representing commercial interests.74 Professor Speidel,
former reporter for Revised Article 2, noted that “‘strong sellers,’ such as

63. About the ULC, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/
Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). Today, more
than 300 attorneys from the fifty states, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and District of
Columbia compose the Commissioners. Id.
64. Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws
Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 90–
91 (1993).
65. Id. at 91.
66. Id.; see also Types of Committees, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://nccuslwww.
uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Types%20of%20Committees (last visited Feb. 15,
2013) (describing the role of the ABA in the drafting process).
67. Types of Committees, supra note 66.
68. Patchel, supra note 64, at 89, 91.
69. Id. at 92. Note that former reporter for Article 2, Professor Richard Speidel,
stated that “there is no such thing as a politically neutral revision.” Speidel, supra note
7, at 609.
70. See Patchel, supra note 64, at 120.
71. Id. at 120; see infra notes 150–54 and accompanying text.
72. 51 HANDBOOK NAT’L CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS &
PROC. 136 (1941); Patchel, supra note 64, at 98–101, 121–22.
73. See Patchel, supra note 64, at 124; Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 22, at 143.
74. See Gail Hillebrand, The Uniform Commercial Code Drafting Process: Will
Articles 2, 2B and 9 Be Fair to Consumers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 69, 90 (1997) (involved
parties included National Association of Manufacturers, IBM, Chrysler, Mobile Oil,
National Electrical Manufacturers Association, and Microsoft).
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General Electric, the American Automobile Manufacturer’s Association,
and other manufacturers, were well represented in the Article 2 drafting
process.”75 These “strong sellers” participated in the discussions regarding
Article 2 revisions, prepared memoranda in response to proposed revisions,
and ultimately lobbied against the revisions.76 The Commissioners
acquiesced to this opposition and changed the revision process from a
complete overhaul to discrete amendments to appease the business
community.77 Ultimately, the business community seems to prefer the
uniform code model because the Commissioners always favor the needs
of business over those of the consumer.78
This bias toward business interests occurs for a number of reasons.
First, consumer groups are often unaware of the amendment process. At
the beginning of the drafting process, the drafting committee identifies
interested groups and invites them to participate in the revision process.79
These invited groups generally represent the interests of businesses but
not consumers.80 This exclusion could be because the drafters generally
are commercial lawyers who bring that perspective into the drafting
process.81 Alternatively, the Commissioners may be concerned that
consumer-oriented provisions prevent enactment at the state level due to
the state lobbying power of businesses,82 and therefore do not invite
consumer groups—or invite a limited number of consumer groups—in
order to avoid the issue altogether.
Although any interest group may participate in the revision process
without an invitation, the average consumer—and, unfortunately, even
the average attorney—is unfamiliar with the NCCUSL and therefore
unaware of any of its drafting meetings.83 Without knowledge of the

75. Speidel, supra note 7, at 617.
76. Id. at 618 (“The attitude was do it our way or else . . . .”).
77. Id.
78. Julian B. McDonnell, The Code Project Confronts Fundamental Dilemmas, 26
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 683, 688 (1993). On the flipside, “[f]rom a consumer advocate’s
point of view, the UCC never provided a real base for consumer protection. The UCC
appears biased against . . . the retail consumer . . . .” Egon Guttman, U.C.C. D.O.A.: Le
Roi Est Mort, Vive Le Roi, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 625, 635 (1993).
79. Miller, supra note 62, at 716.
80. See Patchel, supra note 64, at 122.
81. Cohen & Zaretsky, supra note 41, at 559; Patchel, supra note 64, at 131;
Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 22, at 145.
82. Patchel, supra note 64, at 124, 137, 148.
83. Id. at 129.
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NCCUSL and its activities, consumer groups expectedly are absent from
the amendment process.
Second, participation in the amendment process is too costly for
consumer groups.84 The revision process generally takes three to five
years, which requires considerable resources for such a long commitment.85
Funding for state consumer agencies and consumer interest groups varies
each year, making it difficult to commit to such a long amendment
process.86 Moreover, the complex and technical nature of the knowledge
required to participate in the revision process requires consumer groups,
which are often staffed by nonattorneys, to consult costly experts.87
Consumer agencies and interest groups simply do not have the resources
to invest in this costly revision process.88
Finally, the Commissioners themselves are generally attorneys who
represent commercial clients and inadvertently bring that bias into the
revision process.89 During the most recent attempt to revise Article 2,
the drafting committee consisted of thirteen members, five of which
were private attorneys with business clients.90 These members have a
familiarity with the practices and needs of business, which increases their
sensitivity to those needs.91 As such, they tend to focus on the needs and
desires of their commercial clients during the revision process.
Additionally, although the members themselves are also consumers, they
are not the “average” consumer in that they are of higher income and
education.92 This disconnect often leads to unfamiliarity with how the
revisions will impact the average consumer.93
Article 2’s bias toward business is problematic. The Commissioners,
by drafting provisions from the perspective of businesses, fail to
remember that Article 2 applies to all sales of goods, not just sales between

84. Hillebrand, supra note 74, at 82–83; Patchel, supra note 64, at 132.
85. Hillebrand, supra note 74, at 82; William J. Woodward, Jr., Private Legislation in
the United States: How the Uniform Commercial Code Becomes Law, 72 TEMP. L. REV.
451, 457–58 & n.32 (1999).
86. Hillebrand, supra note 74, at 82.
87. Id. at 83; Patchel, supra note 64, at 132, 135.
88. Hillebrand, supra note 74, at 82.
89. Cohen & Zaretsky, supra note 41, at 559; Patchel, supra note 64, at 131;
Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 22, at 145. Members of the subcommittees of the
Commissioners typically do not include public interest attorneys or attorneys who
represent consumers but rather attorneys with commercial law practices. Hillebrand,
supra note 74, at 84; Woodward, supra note 85, at 456–57.
90. Hillebrand, supra note 74, at 85 (seven law professors, one state legislator, and
five private attorneys).
91. Id. at 84.
92. Id. (citing James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2096–97
(1991); Jean Braucher, The UCC Gets Another Rewrite, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1966, at 66, 68).
93. Id.
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businesses.94 Consumers ultimately drive our national economy; without
consumers to buy the end product, business becomes unnecessary.95
A sales law should work for all parties involved in the transaction rather
than favor one party, especially when the favored party tends to be the
stronger party in the transaction.96
Admittedly, interest group involvement in the American lawmaking
process is not radical or unique to the UCC process. However, unlike
the lobbies or interest groups in the typical legislative process who try to
influence the people making the laws, the business interest groups in the
UCC model actually help draft the laws by participating in study groups
and advisory boards.97 The Commissioners incorporate the business
interest groups’ comments into the draft or simply leave untouched any
provisions to which those groups oppose changes.98 This extensive
involvement coupled with the lack of consumer representation results in
a process that promotes business interests over consumer interests rather
than balancing the competing interests for a more comprehensive and
inclusive body of sales law.
C. A Static Uniform Commercial Code
Given the increasing complexity of our commercial environment,
sales law must adapt to the needs of commerce in order to be an efficient
and effective body of law.99 The law must serve the needs of its users,
and to do so, it must change as the needs of its users change. Moreover,
a body of sales law must be amended easily to address poor language
choices as they present themselves. Unfortunately, Article 2 has failed
to adapt to the changes in both commerce and the needs of its users.100
In fact, Article 2 has not been updated materially since it was first widely
adopted over half a century ago.101
Over the past fifty years, a number of issues have come to light
regarding the outdated and complex nature of Article 2. First, the
94. Rosmarin, supra note 40, at 1594.
95. See id. at 1595.
96. Miller, supra note 62, at 726; Rosmarin, supra note 40, at 1594–95; Speidel,
supra note 7, at 618.
97. Hillebrand, supra note 74, at 89; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 62, at 610.
98. Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 22, at 143 (citing Patchel, supra note 64, at 124).
99. Phillips, supra note 46, at 65; Smythe, supra note 8, at 452.
100. Guttman, supra note 78, at 628.
101. William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong?, 11 DUQ. BUS.
L.J. 131, 131 (2009).
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Commissioners purposely drafted Article 2 using standards rather than
precise rules with the expectation that judges would define the standards.102
The idea was to allow the law to adapt as times changed, without going
through the difficult amendment process. However, standards such as
reasonableness and good faith are difficult concepts to ascertain for
judges and juries as these concepts require knowledge of the applicable
industry.103 The end result of Article 2’s standards is dramatically different
opinions on the same provision.104 Although standards play an important
role in sales law, more clarification is needed in Article 2 to assist the
fact finder in correctly analyzing the applicable standard.
Second, poor drafting choices have presented themselves as courts
struggle to interpret Article 2. Certain language choices that seemed clear
initially have proven anything but clear. A prime example is section 2202, Article 2’s codification of the parol evidence rule.105 On its face,
section 2-202 seems quite straightforward: additional, consistent terms
can supplement an agreement unless the writing was intended as a complete
and exclusive statement of the terms. 106 However, one look at the
jurisprudence demonstrates the chaos in determining “intent.”107 One
approach is to view intent by looking at the “four corners” of the
agreement; if the document appears final, then the parties intended for
the document to be complete and exclusive.108 The second approach is
to examine the conduct and language of the parties to determine whether
the parties intended the document to be complete and exclusive.109 If the
particular subject matter is not dealt with in the agreement, then the
agreement likely is not complete and exclusive.110 The final approach is
to examine the surrounding circumstances of the agreement to determine
the parties’ actual intent.111 Ultimately, the Commissioners must revise
provisions such as section 2-202 to ensure Article 2 is a clear and concrete
body of sales law.
102. Maggs, supra note 16, at 556. For an interesting discussion on how standards
are not a conscious policy choice but instead the result of the private lawmaking process
of the Uniform Commercial Code, see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 62.
103. See Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 1100.
104. See Scott, supra note 47, at 684; supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
105. See Taylor, supra note 31, at 346.
106. U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (2012).
107. Taylor, supra note 31, at 346–47.
108. Id. at 346 (citing 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H. E. JAEGER, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 633 (3d ed. 1961)).
109. Id. at 346–47 (quoting 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2430, at 98 (3d ed. 1940)).
110. Id. at 347.
111. Id. (quoting 3 A RTHUR L INTON C ORBIN , C ORBIN ON C ONTRACTS :
A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 577, at 396–400
(1960)).
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Third, Article 2 contains many complex and nonsensical provisions.
For example, legal scholars and practitioners alike rightfully have
criticized section 2-207’s battle of the forms as overly technical, arbitrary,
and unpredictable.112 Section 2-207 determines whether standard form
agreements exchanged by the parties constitute a contract, and if so, the
terms of that contract.113 It ultimately grants one party an “unearned and
unfair advantage” simply based on timing; the party that happens to send
the form first—or in some cases, second—receives the advantage by
having the terms of its agreement govern the transaction despite the
parties not explicitly agreeing to those terms.114 As such, section 2-207
is completely arbitrary in its application and fails to adhere to one of the
underlying policies of Article 2—to enforce the actual bargain of the
parties. The Commissioners must revise provisions such as section 2207 so that the outcome reflects the intent of the parties rather than
determine the outcome based upon chance.115
Fourth, Article 2 contains a number of outdated provisions. By the
time states widely adopted Article 2 in the 1960s, the language was
almost twenty years old.116 To add to its obsolescence, Article 2 has not
been updated materially since its original adoption.117 One example is
section 2-201’s statute of frauds. The statute of frauds, which the
American legal system borrowed from England as a way to prevent
perjury, has been repealed in England, and most other countries do not

112. There are numerous discussions and critiques of section 2-207. See, e.g.,
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-3, at 37–54
(6th ed. 2010) (“Unfortunately, the section is like an amphibious tank that was originally
designed to fight in swamps, but was sent to fight in the desert.”); Caroline N. Brown,
Restoring Peace in the Battle of the Forms: A Framework for Making Uniform
Commercial Code Section 2-207 Work, 69 N.C. L. REV. 893 (1991); Daniel Keating,
Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678 (2000); John E.
Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the “Battle of the Forms”: Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307
(1986); Corneill A. Stephens, On Ending the Battle of the Forms: Problems with
Solutions, 80 KY. L.J. 815 (1992).
113. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2012).
114. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, PRINCIPLES OF SALES LAW § 2-3, at
44–46 (2009).
115. For similar critiques of section 2-209, see Beth A. Eisler, Oral Modification of
Sales Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Statute of Frauds Problem,
58 WASH. U. L.Q. 277 (1980); John E. Murray, Jr., The Modification Mystery: Section 2209 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1987); and Douglas K.
Newell, Cleaning Up U.C.C. Section 2-209, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 487 (1990).
116. See Kamp, supra note 17, at 277.
117. See Henning, supra note 101, at 131.
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have a similar concept.118 Requiring a written document in order to have
an enforceable contract is a “formalistic anachronism.”119 Today’s
technological advances make forgery of written documents as easy as
perjury, thus defeating the underlying purpose of the statute of frauds.
Moreover, the Commissioners have not revised Article 2 to update the
$500 floor for inflation since Article 2’s inception.120 Five hundred
dollars in 1950 translates to approximately $4800 today.121 With outdated
provisions like section 2-201, Article 2 is a body of sales law crafted to
meet the needs of commerce during a time when deals were consummated
in a room with a pen and not via e-mail with an electronic signature.
The Commissioners must update Article 2 to ensure that it meets the
current needs of modern commerce, taking into account how business is
conducted in today’s technologically driven commercial environment.122
Fifth, sales law must recognize that consumer sales are merely a type
of sales transaction. Article 2 governs all sales of goods, regardless of
whether the transaction involves businesses, consumers, or both. As
such, Article 2 should include provisions fair and useful to consumers
and not just businesses.123 Currently, Article 2 contains few provisions
that address consumer issues,124 and many of the provisions that do

118. See Guttman, supra note 78, at 628.
119. Id.
120. See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2012).
121. The relative value of $500 in 1950 was approximately $4770 in 2012. See
Relative Value of the US Dollar, MEASURINGWORTH.COM, http://www.measuring
worth.com/uscompare/ (enter “1950” in “Initial Year” form, “500” in “Initial Amount”
form, and “2012” in “Desired Year” form; then follow “Calculate” hyperlink) (last
visited Feb. 15, 2013).
122. For a detailed discussion regarding the defects related to the statute of frauds,
see Michael J. Herbert, Procedure and Promise: Rethinking the Admissions Exception to
the Statute of Frauds Under U.C.C. Articles 2, 2A, and 8, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 203 (1992);
Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions
of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 39 (1974–1975); and John M. Feser, Jr., Legislation
Review, Has Communications Technology Rendered the Statute of Frauds a Fraud of a
Statute?, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 431 (1999). Criticism over the statute of frauds dates
back well over a century. E.g., Francis M. Burdick, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, 16
COLUM. L. REV. 273 (1916); James Fitzjames Stephen & Frederick Pollock, Section
Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds, 1 LAW Q. REV. 1 (1885); Hugh Evander Willis, The
Statute of Frauds—A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427 (1928).
123. Rosmarin, supra note 40, at 1594–95; see also Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding
Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (advocating stronger protections for consumers from unconscionable
contracts); supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text (discussing the exclusion of
consumer-oriented provisions from Article 2). For a discussion of possible consumer
provisions the Commissioners should consider for Article 2, see Fred H. Miller,
Consumers and the Code: The Search for the Proper Formula, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 187
(1997); Rosmarin, supra note 40, at 1606–33; Rubin, supra note 38, at 53–54, 65–68.
124. Fred H. Miller, Consumer Issues and the Revision of U.C.C. Article 2, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1565, 1571 (1994).
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address consumer transactions fail to acknowledge that transactions
involving consumers vary drastically from transactions between businesses.125
Merchants generally have resources and technical knowledge that
consumers simply do not possesses.126 Additionally, consumers and
merchants possess different expectations.127 If an underlying policy of
Article 2 is to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties, then it
should recognize this difference in expectations.128 Accordingly, the
Commissioners must revise Article 2 to include more provisions that
address this imbalance between merchants and consumers.
The fact that the Commissioners have not updated Article 2 materially
in over half a century is not for lack of desire or effort on the part of the
Commissioners.129 The problem lies in the uniform code model itself,
which is not conducive to fixing drafting issues or adapting to changing
commerce quickly and effectively. Not only do the Commissioners have
to reach a consensus on what changes to accept, the Commissioners
must convince fifty states to adopt those changes.130 Aware of this
conundrum, no matter the effort or dedication, the Commissioners develop
“vague and open-ended revision[s] that largely reinforce[] the status
quo” or avoid the issue altogether in order to ensure enactment by the
states.131
This arduous and fruitless process is demonstrated by the NCCUSL’s
recent failure to amend Article 2. The process was so dramatic and

125. Caroline Edwards, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer
Protection: The Refusal To Experiment, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 663, 699 (2004) (“[Article
2] continues, with only limited exceptions, the common law tradition of providing rules
that make no distinction between merchant and non-merchant contracts or between
consumer and merchant contracts.”); Rosmarin, supra note 40, at 1593; Rubin, supra
note 38, at 14 (“[C]ommon law has remained at the foundation of the vast majority of the
Code’s provisions. As a result, the Code inherits the common law’s blindness to
consumer concerns . . . .”).
126. See Rosmarin, supra note 40, at 1596.
127. Id. at 1607.
128. Id. (“Protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties is one of the
overriding policies of the U.C.C.” (citing U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 1 (1990))).
129. Henning, supra note 101, at 131–32.
130. Patchel, supra note 64, at 92; see also Hiram Thomas, The Federal Sales Bill
as Viewed by the Merchant and the Practitioner, 26 VA. L. REV. 537, 538 (1940)
(discussing the difficulty of convincing states to adopt uniform codes).
131. Scott, supra note 47, at 680; see Patchel, supra note 64, at 101; Rasmussen,
supra note 5, at 1101; Speidel, supra note 7, at 608 (“[T]he goal of NCCUSL is to ‘get it
right enough to get it enacted.’”).
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protracted that a number of legal scholars and participants in the process
have written entire articles on the failed attempt to revise Article 2.132
In short, the NCCUSL appointed a study group to evaluate Article 2
for areas of improvement in the late 1980s.133 After the study group
submitted its findings, which contained many of the substantive defects
mentioned above, the Commissioners appointed commercial law expert
Professor Richard Speidel as the reporter for the Committee to Revise
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 (the Committee) and, a few years
later, Professor Linda Rusch as the associate reporter.134 The
Commissioners gave broad instructions to the Committee for drafting the
revisions.135 The result was an entire reorganization of Article 2 under a
“hub and spoke” approach with one chapter devoted to general
provisions—the hub—and two chapters devoted each to sale of goods
and licensing—the spokes.136 The Committee revised virtually every
section of Article 2 and changed the numbering system.137
When the Committee presented the draft to the Commissioners for a
vote, the backlash was instantaneous due to the substantial number of
changes and the inclusion of licensing.138 The Commissioners received
numerous objection letters from businesses that led to a fierce debate
among the Commissioners.139 The fight became so vicious that the
business community placed a full-page advertisement in USA Today to
urge rejection of the draft.140 The hostility and debate over the revisions
led Professors Speidel and Rusch to resign in protest.141
As a result, the NCCUSL appointed a new reporter and decided to turn
the revision into discrete amendments despite the recognized need for an
overhaul of Article 2 in order to achieve consensus.142 In 2003, the
Commissioners agreed upon a revised Article 2 that they released for
enactment.143 Although the Commissioners were finally able to agree on

132. E.g., Henning, supra note 101; Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of
Revised Article 2: The Never Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV.
1683 (1999); Speidel, supra note 7.
133. Henning, supra note 101, at 132.
134. Id.; Fred H. Miller, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 on Sales of Goods
and the Uniform Law Process: A True Story of Good v. ?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 143, 145
(2009).
135. Henning, supra note 101, at 132.
136. Id. at 134; Speidel, supra note 7, at 612.
137. See Henning, supra note 101, at 132.
138. See id. at 132–35.
139. Id. at 135.
140. Id. at 135–36.
141. Id. at 136; Speidel, supra note 7, at 611.
142. Henning, supra note 101, at 132.
143. David Frisch, Amended U.C.C. Article 2 as Code Commentary, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J.
175, 176 (2009).
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discrete amendments, they could not convince even one state to adopt
the revision.144 All in all, the revision process took well over a decade,
resulted only in minor changes, and failed to yield enactment at the state
level because the minor revisions were not worth taking the time and
effort to adopt.145 Recognizing this failure, the Commissioners officially
withdrew the revised Article 2 in May 2011.146
Ultimately, despite the need for numerous substantive changes to
Article 2 in order to bring greater clarity, predictability, and uniformity
to the law of sales, the Commissioners have been unsuccessful in
amending Article 2 in any meaningful way.
III. THE BENEFITS OF FEDERALIZATION
Given Article 2’s current deficiencies, the time for a new solution is
now, before the deficiencies affect commerce more profoundly. That
new solution is the enactment of a federal sales act to supplant fully
Article 2.
The concept of a federal sales act certainly is not novel. Recognizing
the failure of the Uniform Sales Act to produce uniformity among the
states, Professor Williston, with the backing of the American Bar
Association, proposed a federal sales act in 1922.147 The proposed bill
was based on the Uniform Sales Act but with revisions and clarifications.148
Although the bill was introduced in Congress and legislative hearings
occurred, the proposal died quickly and quietly without explanation.149
Over the next decade, powerful interest groups continued to lobby for
a federal sales act to bring uniformity and predictability to commercial
transactions.150 Finally, in January 1937, their lobbying resulted in
Representative Walter Chandler, a former member of the NCCUSL,

144. Id.
145. See id.; Henning, supra note 101, at 132.
146. 88th Annual Meeting Updates, AM. L. INST., http://2011am.ali.org/updates.cfm
(last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
147. George W. Bacon, The Proposed Federal Sales Act, 9 FORDHAM L. REV. 233,
233 (1940).
148. Thomas, supra note 130, at 543.
149. Bacon, supra note 147, at 233; McCurdy, supra note 9, at 587; Thomas, supra
note 130, at 543.
150. Smythe, supra note 8, at 468.
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introducing a federal sales bill in Congress that mirrored the federal sales
act proposed by Professor Williston in 1922.151
When the bill was proposed, the Merchants’ Association of New
York, a not-for-profit organization to foster trade and commerce, began
a study of that bill to determine whether the bill provided a practical guide
for merchants.152 Within months, the Merchants’ Association recommended
many amendments to the federal sales bill that Representative Chandler
incorporated into a new bill that he introduced in Congress in July 1937.153
This bill reached the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
but never made it to a hearing and subsequently died, again without
explanation.154
A few years later, the federal sales bill was reawakened due to a
roundtable discussion at a conference held by the Association of American
Law Schools.155 As a result, Representative Herron Pearson introduced
in Congress a new federal sales bill that would apply only to interstate
sales of goods.156
This proposed act greatly concerned the Commissioners.157 After
seeing the changes made to the failed 1937 bill, the Commissioners were
concerned that the federal sales bill would be so vastly different from the
Uniform Sales Act that it would lead to different results depending on
whether the transaction was interstate or intrastate, thus moving further
away from their goal of uniformity in the law of sales.158 Also, the
Commissioners were concerned that a federal sales bill could erode
states’ rights to legislate on matters pertaining to intrastate sales.159
Consequently, the Commissioners began revising the Uniform Sales Act

151.

H.R. 1619, 75th Cong. (1937); 47 HANDBOOK NAT’L CONF. COMMISSIONERS
85 (1937).
152. Thomas, supra note 130, at 543–44.
153. H.R. 7824, 75th Cong. (1937); Patchel, supra note 64, at 95 (citing TWINING,
supra note 18, at 277); Thomas, supra note 130, at 544.
154. See Thomas, supra note 130, at 544.
155. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, supra note 15, at 4;
Bacon, supra note 147, at 233.
156. H.R. 8176, 76th Cong. (1940); see Patchel, supra note 64, at 97; Taylor, supra
note 10, at 530; Thomas, supra note 130, at 544–45.
157. Taylor, supra note 10, at 530.
158. McCurdy, supra note 9, at 589–90 (quoting 48 HANDBOOK NAT’L CONF.
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS & PROC. 249 (1938)).
159. Amelia H. Boss, The Future of the Uniform Commercial Code Process in an
Increasingly International World, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 353 (2007) (quoting Taylor,
supra note 31, at 361–62); id. at 353 n.13 (citing Allison Dunham, A History of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 233, 237 (1965)); Smythe, supra note 8, at 468 (citing WALTER P. ARMSTRONG,
A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 53 (1991)).
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS & PROC.
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and lobbying against the bill in Congress.160 In the end, the Commissioners
had a bit of luck on their side. Due to World War II, the proposed federal
sales act died, giving the Commissioners much needed time to revise the
Uniform Sales Act before a new federal sales bill could be brought
before Congress again.161
The Commissioners teamed up with the American Law Institute and
released the first version of the UCC in 1951.162 Only Pennsylvania
initially adopted the UCC, in 1953.163 It was not until a number of changes
were made at the suggestion of a New York law reform commission that
the remaining states followed suit.164 By 1968, Louisiana was the only
state that had not adopted the UCC due to that state’s civil law system.165
This overwhelming success of the UCC displaced the need for a federal
sales act.166 Consequently, a federal sales bill has not been introduced in
Congress since the inception of the UCC.
Article 2’s increasing ineffectiveness and antiquated nature coupled
with a more defined scope of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause now make a federal sales act a viable option. First, a federal
sales act solves the uniformity issue quite easily.167 Replacing Article 2
with a federal sales act automatically brings the count from fifty sales
laws to just one national sales law. Also, even with concurrent jurisdiction
between the federal and state judiciaries, a federal sales act makes
substantial progress toward solving variations due to judicial interpretations.
Not only would every judge work with the same language, a federal
sales act could also remove some of the vagueness of Article 2.168
Therefore, less chance exists for varying interpretations among courts.
When variations in interpretation do occur, the Supreme Court can
resolve those conflicts to keep the law consistent and predictable.169

160. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, supra note 15, at 8;
McCurdy, supra note 9, at 589–90; Taylor, supra note 10, at 530.
161. See Taylor, supra note 10, at 530.
162. See Kennedy, supra note 58, at 1225; Maggs, supra note 16, at 547.
163. Maggs, supra note 16, at 547.
164. Id. at 547–48.
165. Id. at 548.
166. Kennedy, supra note 58, at 1234 (“[F]ederal enactment of the Code . . . is not
an urgent agenda item.”).
167. See Llewellyn, supra note 15, at 561.
168. See discussion supra notes 47–57 and accompanying text.
169. Bacon, supra note 147, at 238; Schnader, supra note 45, at 232; Hintze, supra
note 41, at 741.
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Some objectors to a federal sales act are concerned that creating a
federal sales law would add to the already burdened federal courts.170
However, a large number of cases involving Article 2 are already
brought in federal court so any additional burden would be minimal.171
Also, lawsuits are less likely to occur under a federal sales act, because,
as discussed above, the federal sales act would be more uniform and
therefore its outcome more predictable with less need for litigation.172
Finally, small claims courts would remain in place, leaving these claims
at the state court level.173
Second, a federal sales act addresses many of the issues that arise in
the amendment process for Article 2. Congress can pass amendments
that apply to the entire country rather than require the Commissioners to
agree upon an amendment and then hope that each state passes that
amendment.174 Congress regularly amends acts, and amending a federal
sales act would be no different.175 Also, unlike the Commissioners,
Congress does not need to worry about whether the states will pass the
act, so amendments can have substance rather than just continue the
status quo in order to ensure enactment.176 Whereas the Commissioners
simply avoid contentious issues to ensure enactment at the state level,177

170. See Braucher, supra note 9, at 111; Hintze, supra note 41, at 741–42.
171. The Author conducted two informal surveys of cases organized under the
Westlaw “Sales” keynote and of UCC cases through Westlaw Next. These studies
evaluated the number of opinions published between 2008 and 2011 by federal and state
courts with respect to commercial law matters. The first study examined the number of
opinions addressing the UCC in general during that timeframe and found that over fifty
percent of opinions were published by federal courts. The second study examined the
number of opinions addressing sale of goods during that timeframe and found that over
sixty percent of opinions were published by federal courts. The Author acknowledges
the imprecise nature of these studies as they only evaluate the number of opinions
published and not the number of cases filed. However, the disparity between federal and
state court opinions seems to suggest that the number of federal cases addressing Article
2 issues certainly is not insignificant. The likely reason for this disparity is that the
parties file in federal court due to diversity jurisdiction—thus supporting the contention
that our commercial environment is a truly national commercial environment.
172. See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
173. These small claims decisions would not upset uniformity as these decisions are
not reported and thus not binding precedent. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration
and the Individualization Critique, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 69, 78 (2007) (“[S]mall claims
courts typically [do not] publish their decisions or create precedent . . . .” (citing Glenn
E. Roper, Eternal Student Loan Liability: Who Can Sue Under 20 U.S.C § 1091a?, 20
BYU J. PUB. L. 35, 38 (2005))).
174. Thomas, supra note 130, at 540.
175. See Fred H. Miller & Albert J. Rosenthal, Uniform State Laws: A Discussion
Focused on Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 257,
319 (1997).
176. See Scott, supra note 47, at 680.
177. See Jean Braucher, Foreword: Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1997).
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Congress generally tackles them and discovers ways to resolve such
matters.178 “While Congress, as an institution, is hardly the hotbed of
political courage, it consists of politicians accustomed to resolving many
matters by contested votes rather than by consensus.”179 By no means is
passing amendments in Congress easy, quick, or amicable, but the
legislative process is still better than the current uniform model for drafting
and passing amendments that contain real substance.
Third, the federal legislative process, although certainly not interest
group free, is better at balancing these competing interests. A greater
number of interest groups exist at the federal legislative level, which
serves to weaken the power of any one group.180 In 2012, 12,374
lobbyists registered at the federal level representing a variety of interests.181
With the sheer number of interest groups, a greater percentage of which
represent consumer interests than in the Article 2 amendment process,182
the influence of industry would not be as strong at the federal level as it
is with the Commissioners.
Also, consumer interest groups are more likely to take notice of federal
legislation than activities of the NCCUSL.183 The federal legislative
process is quite public, and journalists and activists monitor and report
its activities regularly. Thus, the likelihood of consumer interest groups
becoming involved is greater at the federal level due to greater awareness of
the pending legislation that would impact consumers.
Moreover, the federal legislative process has standing committees
with the ability to gather information that can be used to resolve
conflicting factual claims by competing interest groups.184 Federal
legislators gather empirical data and conduct hearings with sworn
witnesses as part of their drafting process.185 The Commissioners, on the

178. Cohen & Zaretsky, supra note 41, at 560; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 62, at 651.
179. Cohen & Zaretsky, supra note 41, at 560.
180. See Patchel, supra note 64, at 143 (citing HARMON ZEIGLER, INTEREST GROUPS
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 46 (1965)); id. at 149.
181. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Lobbying Database, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2013); see also Ctr. for
Responsive Politics, Top Issues, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
top.php?_showYear=2012&indexType=u (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) (almost 7300
clients on issues relating to taxation, budgetary, and health care issues).
182. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
183. See Miller & Rosenthal, supra note 175, at 319.
184. See Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 1126; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 62, at
651; Scott, supra note 47, at 683.
185. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 62, at 630.
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other hand, rely solely on information obtained from interested parties
who “may have an incentive to misrepresent the truth” and face no
consequence for doing so.186 Federal legislators, therefore, have access
to empirical data and reliable testimony during their decisionmaking to
better resolve the competing interests of businesses and consumers.
Finally, federal legislators are more aware of consumer interests than
the Commissioners given legislators’ accountability to their constituents.187
While the Commissioners have no obligation to represent the interest of
their respective state or residents thereof,188 federal legislators are elected to
do just that and consequently are more conscious of the needs of their
constituents.
Ultimately, the federal legislative process, albeit imperfect, is still better
than the uniform code model. The federal legislative process has varied
and numerous interest groups, a more public process, a formal and thorough
information-gathering process, and accountability to constituents.
Additionally, although interest groups may influence federal legislators,
interest groups do not take part in the drafting process. Consequently,
the federal legislative process is better at understanding and balancing
consumer interests with business interests to produce a comprehensive
sales law that is beneficial to all parties.
IV. THE VIABILITY OF FEDERALIZATION
A federal sales act is a viable solution to the defects in the law of sales
within the American system of government. Not only does such an act
fall within the powers the Constitution grants to Congress under the
Commerce Clause, but it also complies with traditional notions of
federalism.
A. Legal Viability—The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the
authority “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”189
These words have vested Congress with one of its most fundamental and
comprehensive authorities. The attempts to define the boundaries of
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause involve some of the most

186. Id.; see also Speidel, supra note 7, at 608 (noting how the drafting committee
rarely conducts empirical studies).
187. See Cohen & Zaretsky, supra note 41, at 559; Patchel, supra note 64, at 145–46.
188. See Patchel, supra note 64, at 89, 91.
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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debated litigation in the history of the Supreme Court.190 In those seminal
cases, the Court shaped the Commerce Clause into a broad congressional
power over commerce that Congress can utilize to enact and enforce a
federal sales act.191
The most recent case fresh in the minds of legal scholars is National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, in which the Supreme
Court reviewed the power of Congress to mandate health insurance
190. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 32 (2005) (upholding federal law
regulating intrastate, private use of medical marijuana); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating federal law providing civil remedy for gendermotivated violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (holding law
prohibiting possession of guns near a school zone outside the scope of the Commerce
Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding
federal statute that reached purely local hotel); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
302–04 (1964) (confirming Congress’s power to regulate intrastate retail establishments
that affect interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942)
(permitting Congress to regulate home-grown and home-consumed wheat); United States
v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942) (extending Commerce Clause
power to “those intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct
the exercise of the granted power”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
37 (1937) (“Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that
their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce . . . , Congress cannot be
denied the power to exercise that control.”); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304
(1936) (holding statute regulating wage and labor arrangements of intrastate coal
producers beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (invalidating federal statute fixing employee
hours and wages); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935) (striking
down federal statute regulating railroad pension plans); Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v.
United States, 263 U.S. 456, 485 (1924) (“When the adequate maintenance of interstate
commerce involves and makes necessary on this account the incidental and partial
control of intrastate commerce, the power of Congress to exercise such control has been
clearly established.”); Hous., E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 353
(1914) (“[Congress] does possess the power to foster and protect interstate commerce,
and to take all measures necessary or appropriate to that end, although intrastate
transactions . . . may thereby be controlled.”); N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,
357–58 (1904) (explaining liberty of contract does not override congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 228–29 (1899) (deciding Sherman Antitrust Act reaches
private contracts); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1895) (barring
Congress from regulating an intrastate sugar refining monopoly); Brown v. Maryland, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 459 (1827) (invalidating Maryland law requiring importers of
foreign goods to obtain a fifty dollar license); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
239–40 (1824) (prohibiting grant of monopoly to navigate Hudson River that required
any out-of-state boats to obtain a license from the holder of the monopoly).
191. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012) (“The
path of our Commerce Clause decisions has not always run smooth . . . but it is now well
established that Congress has broad authority under the Clause.”).
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coverage.192 Although the Court upheld the mandate under the
congressional power to tax, it invalidated the mandate as exceeding
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.193 The Court
acknowledged Congress’s broad power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate matters substantially affecting interstate commerce, but Congress
nonetheless may not force individuals to purchase an unwanted product:
Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals
precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially
vast domain to congressional authority. Every day individuals do not do an
infinite number of things. In some cases they decide not to do something; in
others they simply fail to do it. Allowing Congress to justify federal regulation
by pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless
decisions an individual could potentially make within the scope of federal
regulation, and—under the Government’s theory—empower Congress to make
those decisions for him.194

Despite this and other recent limitations, Congress still possesses fairly
broad powers under the Commerce Clause. Congress undoubtedly can
regulate a good or activity that involves interstate commerce.195 When
the activity or good regulated is solely intrastate, Congress may still regulate
the transaction provided four requirements are met. First, the intrastate
activity must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.196 Each
instance of the particular intrastate activity does not need to substantially
affect interstate commerce; rather, the type of intrastate activity in the
aggregate only needs to substantially affect interstate commerce.197
Therefore, so long as the “total incidence” of the activity affects the national
economy, Congress may regulate a truly local incident of that activity.198
Second, Congress must demonstrate empirically that the intrastate
activity substantially affects interstate commerce.199 “[S]imply because
Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects

192. Id. at 2576.
193. Id. at 2591, 2600.
194. Id. at 2587.
195. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114–16 (1941).
196. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 548, 559 (1995) (“[A]dmittedly, our case law
has not been clear whether an activity must ‘affect’ or ‘substantially affect’ interstate
commerce in order to be within Congress’ power to regulate it under the Commerce
Clause. . . . We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case law, that the
proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity ‘substantially affects’
interstate commerce.”).
197. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56–57 (2003).
198. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (quoting Perez v. United States, 402
U.S. 146, 154 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 (2010) (“The rational basis
referred to in the Commerce Clause context is a demonstrated link in fact, based on
empirical demonstration.”).
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interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.”200 This requirement,
however, does not mean that Congress must have precise scientific data,
especially when the connection to commerce is obvious.201 If the
connection to commerce is obvious, Congress’s failure to make specific
findings does not invalidate its power under the Commerce Clause.202
Third, Congress may regulate only economic intrastate activities under
the Commerce Clause.203 Solely intrastate criminal activities, such as
firearm possession and gender-motivated crimes, are noneconomic activities
unreachable by Congress. 204 Economic activities, including the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of commodities, are within Congress’s
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.205
Finally, Congress may only regulate an existing commercial activity.206
In other words, Congress may not require individuals to engage in a
commercial activity, but may only regulate their activities once they
actually become engaged in commercial activity.207 Otherwise, allowing
Congress to create a commercial activity is overly expansive and would
make “many of the provisions in the Constitution . . . superfluous.”208
Congress, through this expansive power granted to it under the
Commerce Clause, can enact a federal sales act governing all sales of
goods that would preempt any state sales laws. Indeed, Congress has
already utilized this power to regulate certain commercial matters covered
in the UCC. Examples include the Expedited Funds Availability Act
(UCC Article 4),209 the Market Reform Act (UCC Article 8),210 the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (UCC Article 2),211 the Door-to-Door

200. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
201. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 21.
202. Id.
203. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 567.
204. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–11 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at
561–62, 567.
205. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 25–26.
206. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012).
207. Id. at 2587 (“As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the commerce
power have been, they all have one thing in common: They uniformly describe the
power as reaching ‘activity.’ It is nearly impossible to avoid the word when quoting
them.”).
208. Id. at 2586.
209. 12 U.S.C. § 4001 (2006).
210. Pub. L. 101-432, § 5(b), 104 Stat. 963, 973–74 (1990) (codified as amended in
scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C § 78 (2006)).
211. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2006).
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Sales Rule (UCC Article 2),212 and the Federal Trade Commission Credit
Practices Rule (UCC Articles 3 and 9).213
As expressly stated by the Supreme Court, the sale of goods is an
economic activity that Congress may regulate.214 Moreover, due to
technological advances, a majority of sales transactions transcend state
borders. The growth of online-only retailers such as Amazon.com and
Overstock.com is increasing exponentially every year, with sales on
these sites in the billions of dollars.215 Big-box retailers like Sears, WalMart, and Home Depot are recognizing this shift from in-store to online
purchasing and are consequently expanding their Internet presence.216
These Internet purchases are almost always interstate, with the average
good purchased online traveling 1169 miles to its purchaser.217
Additionally, Internet purchasing is not limited to consumers; even
businesses are ordering their goods online, with many of those goods
crossing state borders to reach their destination.218
In addition to the considerable number of interstate sales transactions
resulting from Internet transactions, most goods sold at retail stores
travel interstate. National retail chains have replaced the local momand-pop store,219 with these national chains shipping a majority of their

212. 16 C.F.R. §§ 429.0–.3 (2012).
213. 16 C.F.R. §§ 444.1–.5 (2012); see also Boss, supra note 159, at 354 & n.15;
Bugge, supra note 10, at 22.
214. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2005).
215. Press Release, Amazon.com, Amazon.com Announces Second Quarter Sales
Up 51% to $9.91 Billion (July 26, 2011), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/201
10726007053/en/Amazon.com-Announces-Quarter-Sales-51-9.91-Billion (describing net
sales of $9.91 billion in second quarter of 2011, with $5.41 billion alone from North
America); Who We Are, OVERSTOCK.COM, http://www.overstock.com/about (last visited
Feb. 15, 2013) (2012 revenues equaled $1,099,289,000).
216. See Zeke Faux, Bondholders Fret as Sears Burns Cash, B LOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK MAG. (June 30, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/bond
holders-fret-as-sears-burns-cash-07012011.html; Robert Malone, Wal-Mart Takes Over
the World, NBCNEWS.COM, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10838942/ns/businessforbes_com/t/wal-mart-takes-over-world/ (last updated Jan. 13, 2006, 5:32 PM); Trefis,
Home Depot Lays a Foundation for Online Growth, DAILYFINANCE (June 22, 2011, 8:00
AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/06/22/home-depot-lays-a-foundation-for-onlinegrowth/.
217. Shipment Characteristics by Origin Geography by NAICS: 2007 Commodity
Flow Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU AM. FACTFINDER, http://factfinder2.census.gov/
faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=CFS_2007_00A05&prodType=tab
le (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
218. See E-Stats, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 10, 2012), http://www.census.gov/
econ/estats/2010/2010reportfinal.pdf (indicating that forty-six percent of all manufacturing
shipments were ordered online in 2010).
219. See, e.g., Erin Durkin & Bill Hutchinson, Chains Chokin’ Off Mom-and-Pop
Shops, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 31, 2008, 11:11 PM), http://articles.nydailynews.com/
2008-07-31/local/29435094_1_jonathan-bowles-chain-stores-urban-future (acknowledging
more than 5700 national chains within the five boroughs of New York City).
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goods from warehouses or distributors outside of the states where the
branch stores are located.220 Even locally-owned stores purchase goods
from out of state for sale in the stores. Thus, most consumers are buying
goods that have traveled interstate, and as a result, those sales transactions
impact interstate commerce.
In the grand scheme of the national economy, truly intrastate transactions
are rare. Even though the product may have been produced locally and
sold locally, the local business purchases equipment, supplies, and other
business-related items from out of state. Indeed, numerous studies exist
that demonstrate that local businesses that locally produce and sell
products spend a significant percentage of their revenues outside of the
local economy.221 Consequently, it is difficult to argue that these few
intrastate transactions, as a whole, do not affect the national economy.
The end result is that a majority of today’s commercial transactions
have some interstate component, and the aggregate of the very few truly
intrastate transactions that exist today nonetheless have some effect upon
interstate commerce. Accordingly, Congress can demonstrate a rational
basis for enacting a federal sales law governing all sales transactions
using the power the Constitution grants to it under the Commerce Clause.
B. Philosophical Viability—Federalism
The United States was founded under the principle of federalism,
which is the belief that the federal government should possess a limited

220. See, e.g., Target Distribution Centers, TARGET (July 21, 2008), http://press
room.target.com/backgrounders/target-distribution-centers; see also NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1937) (“When industries organize themselves
on a national scale . . . how can it be maintained that . . . Congress may not enter when it
is necessary to protect interstate commerce . . . ?”).
221. For example, in the midcoast region Maine, out-of-state purchases account for
forty-seven percent of total spending by local businesses. INST. FOR LOCAL SELFRELIANCE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LOCALLY OWNED BUSINESSES VS. CHAINS: A CASE
STUDY IN MIDCOAST MAINE 2 (2003), available at http://www.ilsr.org/wp-content/
uploads/files/midcoaststudy.pdf. In Austin, Texas, approximately fifty-four percent of
total spending by local business occurs outside of the local economy. See CIVIC
ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS: A CASE STUDY—LOCAL MERCHANTS VS.
CHAIN RETAILERS 14 (2002), available at http://civiceconomics.com/app/download/5841
748704/Lamar+Retail+Analysis.pdf. In Chicago, fifty-seven percent of chain firm
spending occurs outside of the local economy and thirty-two percent of local business
spending occurs outside of the local economy. CIVIC ECONOMICS, THE ANDERSONVILLE
STUDY OF RETAIL E CONOMICS 5 (2004), available at http://civiceconomics.com/app/
download/5841713404/AndersonvilleStudy.pdf.
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and defined role in the American political system.222 Recently severed
from the British monarchy, the Framers were concerned that creating an
unchecked federal government could lead to an abuse of power and result in
the same tyranny they fought against in the American Revolution.223
Indeed, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton wrote many of the
Federalist Papers in the hopes of alleviating such fears.224 They explained
that the federal government’s powers were limited to matters affecting
the entire country, such as foreign relations, the military, and the national
economy.225
This concern over the federal government’s power resulted in the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which reads: “The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”226 The idea was
that this “healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government [would] reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse.”227
Because the Commerce Clause expressly grants Congress the power to
regulate matters of interstate commerce, the exercise of this power is
within the boundaries of the Tenth Amendment. In enacting a federal
sales act, Congress simply would use a power already granted to it and
nothing more.228
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has dismissed outright the argument
that the Tenth Amendment imposes any specific limitations on the
Commerce Clause:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it
was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the

222. E. Norman Veasey, What Would Madison Think? The Irony of the Twists and
Turns of Federalism, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 36–37 (2009).
223. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1768
(2006); Julian Epstein, Evolving Spheres of Federalism after U.S. v. Lopez and Other Cases,
34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525, 527 (1997).
224. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 10, 14, 45 (James
Madison).
225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 105–06 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (“Commerce, finance, nego[t]iation and war seem to comprehend all the objects,
which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to
these objects ought in the first instance to be lodged in the national depository.”); see
also Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 17
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 221, 230 (2005) (stating Founders’ belief that government would
have power over national interests such as foreign relations, defense, and a national
economy).
226. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
227. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
228. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156–59 (1992).
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amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new
national government might seek to exercise powers not granted . . . .229

Thus, the Tenth Amendment permits the federal government to act only
when the Constitution expressly grants the federal government the power to
act and nothing more.230
Instead of the Tenth Amendment, the structure of the federal government
is the appropriate mechanism for protecting states from federal invasion
into truly local concerns.231 The political process, including the selection
of the President through electoral votes and participation of state
representatives in both the House of Representatives and Senate, serves to
prevent Congress from invading areas of state interest.232 This view is
supported in the Federalist Papers: “[T]he constituent body of the
national representatives, or in other words of the people of the several
States, would controul the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite.”233
Additionally, one of the Supreme Court’s roles is to enforce the limits
on the power of the federal government.234 Accordingly, the Supreme
229. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); accord Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (“[T]he fact that the States
remain sovereign as to all powers not vested in Congress or denied them . . . offers no
guidance about where the frontier between federal and state power lies. . . . [W]e have
no license to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.”); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 291 (1981) (“The Court long ago rejected the
suggestion that Congress invades areas reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment
simply because it exercises its authority under the Commerce Clause in a manner that
displaces the States’ exercise of their police powers.”).
230. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) (“This exclusive delegation or rather this alienation of State sovereignty
would only exist . . . where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive
authority to the Union . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 86 (James Madison) (Jacob
Cooke ed., 1961) (“Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which
concern all the members of the republic . . . .”).
231. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556. “[T]he Framers chose to rely on a federal system in
which special restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in the
workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the
objects of federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected
by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system . . . .” Id. at 552.
232. Id. at 550–51, 554 (“[T]he fundamental limitation that the constitutional
scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the ‘States as States’ is one of
process rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint . . . must be tailored to
compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a
‘sacred province of state autonomy.’” (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236
(1983))).
233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 106 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
234. See Chemerinsky, supra note 223, at 1768–69.
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Court has taken the principles of federalism into account when deciding
cases under the Commerce Clause.235 Thus, if a federal sales act is legally
viable under Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is also philosophically
viable as the Supreme Court uses federalism in its limits on congressional
power under the Commerce Clause.236 In other words, analyzing whether a
federal sales act is legally viable and philosophically viable are not two
independent analyses; rather, the two concepts are intertwined.
In addition to the avoidance of tyranny by the federal government,
federalists focus on two additional principles in support of federalism.
First, local matters are more effectively addressed at the state level.237
As each state is composed of a unique group of people with their own
issues and concerns, government should consider these issues and
concerns when legislating on matters affecting its citizens.238 Because
the state government is better in tune with these issues and concerns than
the federal government, state government is the more appropriate venue
for legislation on local matters.239 By limiting the federal government to
matters that affect the entire nation, the states can legislate as appropriate
for their citizens.240
Commercial law, however, and more particularly sales law, is hardly a
local concern. As discussed above, the national nature of the American
commercial environment makes truly local sales transactions rare.241
Additionally, groups affected by commercial law, namely merchants and
consumers, have the same issues and concerns regardless of geographic
location.242 Sales law simply does not involve social mores or the states’
“core police powers,” such as criminal law and the protection of health,
safety, and welfare, which justify local treatment.243 Each party desires
235. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 644–45 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545–52; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 29–30, 37 (1937).
236. Indeed, the economic requirement imposed in Lopez reflects the view that
anything other than economic activity falls outside of the Commerce Clause, a view
which exactly reflects the type of restriction imposed by federalism. David J. Barron,
Fighting Federalism with Federalism: If It’s Not Just a Battle Between Federalists and
Nationalists, What Is It?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 2096 (2006).
237. Patchel, supra note 64, at 150.
238. Taylor, supra note 10, at 548.
239. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“[Federalism] assures a
decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous
society . . . .”); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 936 (1994); Taylor, supra note 10, at 548.
240. Patchel, supra note 64, at 150; Rubin & Feeley, supra note 239, at 936; Taylor,
supra note 10, at 548.
241. Phillips, supra note 46, at 59; Taylor, supra note 10, at 551; see supra notes
215–21 and accompanying text.
242. Elbrecht, supra note 22, at 151; Taylor, supra note 10, at 551.
243. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42–45 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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a sales law that is fair and results in the enforcement of the bargain
between the parties regardless of geographic location. Federalism simply
does not justify why a merchant or consumer in one state should receive
more protection than a merchant or consumer in another state.244
The second additional underlying principle of federalism is that state
governments are more likely to experiment with legislation to discover
the best method to address issues affecting their citizens.245 As such,
keeping most regulatory power at the state level allows for greater
experimentation.246 This experimentation benefits not only the citizens
of the experimenting state, but all similarly situated citizens of other
states that see the benefits of those regulations and choose to adopt them.
When it comes to sales laws, states simply do not experiment, and
when they do, the experimentation has been ineffective. Because Article
2 exists, the states have no incentive to develop their own sales laws.247
Instead of taking the time and money to invest in their own bodies of
sales law, states merely tweak Article 2.248 These tweaks fail to produce
new and innovative sales laws. Also, the technical nature of commercial
law requires states to collect large amounts of data in order to experiment, a
costly and timely task.249 Rather than make that investment, states often
wait until another state performs the task for them.250 The experimentation
that federalism desires simply does not happen in the sales law arena.
Accordingly, a federal sales act would not supplant beneficial
experimentation.
Ultimately, a federal sales act is within the Tenth Amendment as the
Constitution expressly grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce.
244. Taylor, supra note 10, at 551.
245. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“[Federalism] allows for more
innovation and experimentation in government . . . .”); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without the risk to the rest of
the country.”).
246. Taylor, supra note 10, at 548.
247. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy
Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1368–69 (2009); Paul
M. Secunda & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Debate, Workplace Federalism, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 20, 38 (2008), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Work
placeFederalism.pdf.
248. See supra Part II.A.
249. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 239, at 926.
250. Galle & Leahy, supra note 247, at 1341–42; Rubin & Feeley, supra note 239,
at 925–26.
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Further, the national nature of commercial transactions coupled with the
homogenous needs of consumers and merchants remove the federalist
concern that sales law is more appropriate at the state level. Thus, a
federal sales act is philosophically viable under the doctrine of federalism.
V. CONCLUSION
The idea of federalizing the law of sales is a difficult proposition even
in the wake of the criticism of Article 2, as people are always resistant to
change.251 Even the UCC itself received substantial criticism for its
“radical” changes, but despite its flaws the UCC has made great strides
in commercial law. 252 Irrespective of potential resistance, a massive
overhaul is needed in order to modernize the law of sales into a more
uniform, predictable, and reliable body of law that meets the needs of
businesses and consumers alike. A federal sales act to replace Article 2
is just that needed overhaul.
Even if a federal sales act never comes to fruition, hopefully the mere
suggestion of such an act sparks action much the same way it did in the
early twentieth century.253 Whether that action is improvement of the
current amendment process or the development of some other process
not yet conceived, scholars and practitioners alike must focus on
updating and improving sales law given its importance in our complex
commercial environment rather than remain complacent and allow the
current Article 2 to linger unchanged.

251. See, e.g., Rusch, supra note 132, at 1690 (noting resistance to revising Article 2).
252. See generally Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial
Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952) (criticizing the UCC at the time
of its unveiling).
253. See supra notes 147–66 and accompanying text.
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